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‘I will Blow your face off’ – Virtual and Physical World Anti-Muslim 
Hate Crime  
 
Abstract 
Anti-Muslim hate crime is usually viewed in the prism of physical attacks; however, it 
also occurs in a cyber context, and this reality has considerable consequences for 
victims. In seeking to help improve our understanding of anti-Muslim hate crime, this 
article draws on the findings from a project that involved qualitative interviews with 
Muslim men and women who experienced both virtual and physical world anti-
Muslim hate, and reported their experiences to the British government-funded 
service Tell MAMA (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks). In doing so, this article sets out 
the first ever study to examine the nature, determinants and impacts of both virtual 
and physical world anti-Muslim hate crime upon Muslim men and Muslim women in 
the United Kingdom (UK). Correspondingly, we found that victims of both virtual and 
physical world anti-Muslim hate crime are likely to suffer from emotional stress, 
anxiety and fear of cyber threats materialising in the ‘real world’.  
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Introduction 
Following the terrorist attacks in Paris and Tunisia in 2015, and in Woolwich, south 
east London where British Army soldier Drummer Lee Rigby was murdered in 2013, 
we have seen a sharp rise in anti-Muslim attacks (Littler and Feldman 2015). These 
incidents have occurred in the physical world where mosques have been targeted, 
Muslim women have had their hijab (headscarf) or niqab (face veil) pulled off, Muslim 
men have been attacked, and racist graffiti has been scrawled against Muslim 
graves and properties. In addition, there has been a spike in anti-Muslim attacks 
occurring in a cyber context, including Muslims being targeted by campaigns of 
cyber bullying, cyber harassment, cyber incitement and threats of physical violence. 
According to Tell MAMA, 548 verified incidents (of 729) were reported to them 
concerning anti-Muslim hate crime. The majority of incidents took place in a cyber 
context (402 out of 548) (Littler and Feldman 2015). Almost a fifth of service users 
reported repeat incidents of anti-Muslim hate, with Muslim women suffering more 
incidents in the physical world than Muslim men. Typically, the victim was wearing 
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traditional Islamic clothing at the time of the incident and the perpetrators were 
overwhelmingly white male (Littler and Feldman 2015). Indeed, evidence shows that 
individuals with a ‘visible’ Muslim identity are more vulnerable to anti-Muslim hostility, 
intimidation, abuse and threats of violence (see, for example, Allen et al. 2013; 
Zempi and Chakraborti 2014).   
Against this background, the aim of our article is twofold. Firstly, to examine the 
nature and extent of virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate crime directed 
towards Muslims in the UK. Secondly, to consider the impact of this hostility upon 
victims, their families and wider Muslim communities. Drawing on qualitative 
interviews with Muslim men and women who have been victims of both virtual and 
physical world anti-Muslim hate crime in the UK, this is the first ever study to shed 
light on the anti-Muslim hate crime experiences of Muslims both in the virtual and 
physical world, rather than examining these experiences in isolation. It will be 
concluded that especially for repeat victims, it is difficult to isolate the virtual threats 
from the intimidation, violence and abuse that they suffer in the physical world. 
Rather, there is a continuity of anti-Muslim hostility in both the virtual and the 
physical world, especially in the globalised world. 
 
Understanding anti-Muslim hate crime 
Anti-Muslim hate crime falls under the category of religious hate crime. It is not 
limited to physical attacks but includes a wide range of potential criminal behaviour 
from offensive graffiti, damage to property, abusive and threatening messages, 
harassment, intimidation and verbal abuse.  Perry (2001: 10) argues that hate crime 
is about offenders pursuing a level of control and power, and states that a hate crime 
must involve “…acts of violence and intimidation, usually directed towards already 
stigmatized and marginalized groups...”  According to the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (2014), hate crime in a cyber context includes illegal hate content that aims 
to incite hatred based on the grounds of race, religion and sexual orientation. This 
could include; words; posts; forums; videos; chatrooms; pictures and websites. One 
of the problems with understanding hate speech and virtual hate crime is the 
relationship between virtual hate speech and actual acts of violence. For example, 
the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers (1997) argue that hate speech 
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involves all forms of hateful material and content including inciting, promoting and 
justifying racial hatred. They argue that such intolerance is based upon notions of 
nationalism, ethnocentrism, discrimination and stereotyping minority communities. 
Moreover, the Council of Europe’s Additional Protocol to the Convention on 
Cybercrime (2003) defines virtual hate speech as including written material or 
images which promote and incite hatred and discrimination based on a person or 
groups of person’s race, ethnicity, descent and national origin.   
The role therefore of actual ‘threats’, ‘action’ and ‘speech’ problematise the notion of 
what constitutes virtual hate speech and actual hate crime. We argue that virtual 
hate speech includes material of a malicious nature that are posted with the intent to 
promote, or justify intolerance, hostility and prejudice towards an individual or group 
of people. However, the problematic associations with hate speech and hate crime 
on the Internet are exacerbated by the notions of freedom of speech and expression 
within the current climate. Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights (1976) has 
found that people have a right to cause ‘offence’ to others, without clarifying what 
could constitute offence. We believe that this could cause problems where people 
express ideas or dissent, and instead should include material that causes fear 
alongside harassment and intimidation.   
Interestingly, those at the sharp end of tackling much of the virtual hate speech and 
hate crime are social media network sites. For example, Facebook uses its 
community standards to define what it considers to be hate speech, which it defines 
as content that ‘attacks people based on their actual or perceived race, ethnicity, 
national origin, religion, sex, gender, sexual orientation, disability or disease is not 
allowed. We do, however, allow clear attempts at humour or satire that might 
otherwise be considered a possible threat or attack. This includes content that many 
people may find to be in bad taste (ex: jokes, stand-up comedy, popular song lyrics, 
etc)’ (Facebook Community Standards 2015). 
Other sites such as Twitter (2015) whilst not providing a definition of hate speech, do 
make the case that all ‘hateful content, sensitive topics, and violence globally’ are 
prohibited. Another popular, social media site known as Reddit uses its virtual 
community to monitor and report incidents of hate speech. Through the use of 
subreddits (a discussion forum) it allows it’s over 136,000 users to pose questions to 
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other users and challenge any hateful content. Reddit also provides a list of what it 
views as hate speech which include bigotry; overtly sexual comments about 
appearance; body shaming; lewd comments and name calling as hate speech.  
Similarly, YouTube (2015) define hate speech as ‘content that promotes violence or 
hatred against individuals or groups based on certain attributes, such as: race or 
ethnic origin; religion; disability; gender; age; veteran status and sexual 
orientation/gender identity’.   
As noted above, the difficulty therefore in distinguishing virtual hate speech and hate 
crime is further reinforced by the Crown Prosecution guidelines (2013) which state 
that there must be either a credible threat of violence or communications which 
specifically target an individual or group of people.  Such communications must be a 
breach of a court order or is considered grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or 
false. In practice, the element of posing a threat remains the most important reason 
to pursue a prosecution. As a result, we argue that virtual hate speech must be 
viewed in a broader context and we make the case that virtual hate speech intends 
to dehumanise and demonise individuals and does not necessarily need to include 
inciting threats of violence but relies on creating tensions. For example, in our study 
this is personified through the ‘them versus us’ culture (Cole and Cole 2009). 
Furthermore, a key finding that emerges from our project is the fact that anti-Muslim 
hate incidents and crimes increased both in the virtual and physical world following 
‘trigger’ attacks including terrorist attacks carried out by individuals who choose to 
identify themselves as being Muslim or acting in the name of Islam. Such ‘trigger’ 
attacks include the terror attack that hit London in July 2005 and the terror attack that 
hit the United States in September 2001 (Hanes and Machin, 2014; Poynting and 
Mason, 2006). According to Byers and Jones (2007), terrorist attacks have a 
significant impact on the rise of anti-Muslim hate crime. We therefore argue that 
‘trigger’ events such as the terrorist attacks in Paris and Tunisia can also lead to anti-
Muslim hostility and indeed wider impacts on Muslim communities. For example, the 
organisation Tell MAMA, has found that there had been a significant rise in anti-
Muslim attacks, ranging from incitement, harassment, cyber threats to actual 
physical violence, following the Tunisia, Paris and Woolwich events (Littler and 
Feldman 2015).  
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Moreover, local and regional events such as the Rotherham child sexual exploitation 
scandal in the UK have perpetuated anti-Muslim sentiments and ‘legitimised’ anti-
Muslim attacks both in the virtual and physical world (Feldman et al. 2013). Previous 
studies have found that anti-Muslim hate crime has also increased in a cyber 
context, in particular against Muslim women, for example, via social networking sites 
such as Facebook and Twitter (Awan 2014).  Within this context, Muslims are 
deemed to be part of the ‘problem’ and a ‘risk’ to society (Walklate and Mythen 
2014). This is reinforced when discussing issues pertaining to the hijab and niqab 
and the comments used to describe Muslim women as a ‘national security threat’ 
(Mythen et al. 2009). This spike in anti-Muslim prejudice has led to further 
strengthening the narrative of official suspicion and has led to the current debate that 
Muslims are the ‘new suspect community’ (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009; Awan and 
Blakemore 2012; Perry and Alvi 2012; Perry and Olsson 2009; Keats 2014).  
 
Threatening and abusive comments, whether it be by visual images, fake virtual 
profiles, Facebook messages, YouTube videos and tweets, can have a detrimental 
effect on the victims who are targeted, their families and wider communities 
(Poynting and Noble 2004). What our study demonstrates is that anti-Muslim hate 
crime in a cyber context can be ‘normalised’ by offenders on the basis that they 
consistently use anonymity, manipulation and social control to target their victims 
(Douglas et al. 2005). Virtual perpetrators can often hide their identity and conceal 
personal information in order to escape detection. This level of anonymity means 
that many perpetrators of virtual anti-Muslim hostility tend to use the cyber space to 
disguise who they really are, knowing that they are highly likely to evade the 
authorities and thus feeling safe to express hate messages in the cyber world. 
 
However, whilst this form of cyber hate often remains “invisible”, sometimes due to 
offenders deleting tweets, comments or posts and also because the perpetrator can 
hide their identity, the threat remains very real for the victims it targets (Hall 2013).  
As we shall discuss later, the hate images and posts in particular contain a number 
of loaded generalisations with respect to Islam and Muslims. As a result, Muslims 
are considered a “threat”, and the perpetrators of cyber hate stereotype and 
demonise all Muslims in the same manner, and therefore consider them as a group 
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that should be ostracised, deported or killed by using hostile imagery and depicting 
them in an innately negative fashion (Allport 1979; McKenna and Bargh 1998).   
 
The social cognitive theory, as purported by Bandura (2001), provides us with some 
important points to consider with regards to how cyber hate communication can be 
influenced by the social environment. According to Bandura (2001), this approach 
helps to inform groups and creates ‘motivating’ factors. Bandura (2001: 265) states 
that: “ social cognitive theory provides an agentic conceptual framework within 
which to examine the determinants and mechanisms of such effects...” Within the 
construct of cyber hate, motivation and behaviour, groups such as the English 
Defence League (EDL) have been proactive in exploiting the virtual environment and 
are using worldwide events to incite hatred towards Islam and Muslims. Within the 
framework of social cognitive theory, we see how members of groups can act as 
producers within a virtual social environment.  
 
The use of emotional factors are symbols of how hate groups in a cyber context can 
also transform and galvanise groups, and transfer power of the environment to 
create cognitive models of judgement. Meyrowitz (1985) observes that electronic 
media has changed the way in which we interact with each other over time; 
therefore, the Internet has had significant impacts on social behaviour. Moreover, 
Meyrowitz (1985) argues that these virtual behaviours are determined by different 
stages of socialisation in a cyber context. Furthermore, Goodboy and Martin (2015) 
observe that hate groups in a cyber context can build profiles upon certain traits. 
Their study examined the relationships between the Dark Triad personality traits and 
self-reported cyberbullying behaviours. They found three trait behaviours as being 
prominent in such cases, namely; Machiavellianism, Psychopathy and Narcissism 
(Goodboy and Martin 2015: 1).  Goodboy and Martin (2015: 1) also point out that 
cyberbullies attempt to “harass, denigrate, impersonate, or ostracize others” and 
“spend a considerable amount of time online and engage in risky online behaviours”.  
As our study has found, there are overlaps between those aggressive behaviours 
and how anti-Muslim hostility was used through videos and posts in a cyber context 
in order to coordinate aggressive responses and enter into hate-filled dialogue.  
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Similarly, Christopherson (2007) argues that anonymity affords protection for 
individuals and groups in the virtual world. This level of anonymity can influence the 
way individuals behave within cyber groups. This forms part of social psychological 
concepts within cyber groups and includes the notions of ‘bystander apathy’ and 
‘social loafing.’ This level of anonymity in the virtual world was also described by 
Zimbardo (1969) as the ‘deindividuation theory’. This means that anonymity and 
personal social environmental factors can influence cyber behaviour.  Dubrovsky et 
al. (1991) argue that face-to-face communication and electronic communication can 
vary in different groups depending on the social structure. Taking a similar view, 
Hayne et al. (1997) suggest that anonymity in group support systems is used by 
groups to create a cyber presence. McKenna and Bargh (1998) emphasise that 
these identities are built upon a sense of self-esteem and self-belonging.  
 
Social cognitive theory also demonstrates how ‘visible’ Muslims are targeted in the 
cyber world in the wake of national and international ‘trigger’ events. As discussed in 
more detail below, our research questions were semi-structured and explorative in 
nature as we aimed to examine anti-Muslim hostility in both the physical and virtual 
world. Using the basis of emotional impacts within social constructs we hoped to see 
whether people online had been impacted by social behaviour and/or trigger events.  
We also hoped to see how the environment can lead to behaviour patterns and 
trends when reporting anti-Muslim hostility and as a result our research questions 
were based upon notions of the environment, social behaviour and how these 
directly impact upon victims perceptions of the criminal justice system.  Furthermore, 
the Social Learning Theory specifically, examines how people are viewed in a 
mediatised world.  According to Bandura, this type of behaviour can be influenced by 
the environment, behaviour and experiences of cognitive behaviour.  This is 
particularly important in our study since we argue that victims’ personal experiences 
in the virtual world determine their expectations of the criminal justice system as a 
whole. 
 
The Research Project 
The methodology of the study was comprised of 20 individual interviews with Muslim 
men and women who have been victims of both virtual and physical world anti-
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Muslim hate crime in the UK. Participants had reported their experiences to Tell 
MAMA, which is a public service that supports victims of anti-Muslim hate and also 
measures and monitors anti-Muslim incidents. Victims of anti-Muslim abuse can use 
a freephone number to speak to staff or report cyber incidents via social media 
networks such as Twitter, Facebook and via email. In addition, Tell MAMA has a 
website which provides a range of sources and information for victims of anti-Muslim 
hostility and uses the information it receives to pass onto the police service. Within 
this space Tell MAMA staff work closely with victims to help provide them with 
support mechanisms and raise awareness of the experiences of victims of anti-
Muslim abuse.  
Tell MAMA contacted Muslims who had reported both virtual and physical world 
incidents of anti-Muslim hate crime to them within 2015. Once prospective 
participants confirmed their interest in taking part in this study, their details were 
passed on to the researchers of this study, who engaged directly with participants for 
conducting the interviews. Certainly, our sample does not cover the full spectrum of 
views and experiences that might be held by Muslims who have experienced cyber 
and/or physical world anti-Muslim hate crime, and it is not representative of the 
hundreds of victims who have used MAMA’s services. However, we are confident 
that they provide a starting point for academics, researchers and policy makers who 
are working within this area. 
The interviews were conducted between May and August 2015. Participation to this 
study was voluntary. Also, participants’ names have been changed in order to 
ensure their anonymity. Out of the twenty participants, we interviewed eleven female 
and nine male individuals. A common characteristic amongst all participants was that 
they were ‘visibly identifiable’ as Muslim. For example, some of the female 
participants wore the jilbab, hijab and/or niqab whilst the male participants had a 
beard and often wore the traditional Islamic clothing and a cap that identified them as 
being Muslim. In terms of age, the majority of participants were aged between 20 - 
30 years (seven participants aged 20 and over and eight participants aged 30 and 
over) with four participants aged 40 and over and one participant aged 50. The 
youngest participant we interviewed was aged 20 and the oldest was 50. In terms of 
ethnicity, we had a broad and diverse group, which was made up of different 
backgrounds and ethnicity. The interviewees included those from Asian heritage 
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(eleven) participants, White British convert (five), Somalian (three) and Libyan (one). 
The locations where victims were targeted in the physical world varied and included 
public transport, schools and near their homes, business or mosques. Ethical 
considerations involved all participants being able to withdraw their consent at any 
time and all participants were ensured confidentiality and anonymity throughout the 
research study. All data collection instruments used (such as interview questions and 
topic guides for participants) were framed and worded selectively.  
Recordings of the interviews were transcribed and thematically analysed.  
Participants of the interviews consented to being involved in a participant process 
that involved reading and clarifying a summary of the role of the interview before the 
process. Audio-recordings were transcribed verbatim and each participant name has 
been changed to ensure confidentiality and anonymity. Transcripts were read and 
annotated to develop themes, which are defined below. Although it is not possible to 
generalise the current findings due to the qualitative nature of the study, we hope 
that by sharing participants’ stories we shed light on the links between virtual and 
physical world anti-Muslim hate crime, and the multiple impacts it can have upon 
victims, their families and wider Muslim communities.  
It is important to acknowledge that this was a qualitative study based on a very small 
sample; therefore participants’ accounts cannot be generalised to a wider population. 
However, using grounded theory the study provided a detailed exploration of 
participants experiences of both cyber and ‘real’ world anti-Muslim hate crime. Also, 
the research did not speak to perpetrators. Although this aspect was deliberately 
excluded from the parameters of this study, it is evident that we do not actually know 
the motivations that drove the perpetrators to commit the acts that they did. Rather, 
we have to rely on victims’ testimony in order to draw conclusions about offenders’ 
motivations. These limitations do not undermine the significance of the study but it is 
clear that future research should explore them in more depth. 
Determinants of anti-Muslim hate crime incidence 
The prevalence and severity of anti-Muslim hate crimes are influenced by ‘trigger’ 
events of local, national and international significance. As Williams and Burnap 
(2015) point out, hate crimes are communicative acts, which are often provoked by 
antecedent events that incite a desire for retribution in the targeted group, towards 
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the group that share similar characteristics to the perpetrators. From this 
perspective, hate crimes increase following ‘trigger’ events as they operate to 
galvanise tensions and sentiments against the suspected perpetrators and groups 
associated with them. Indeed, evidence shows that anti-Muslim hate crimes have 
increased significantly following ‘trigger’ attacks including terrorist attacks carried out 
by individuals who choose to identify themselves as being Muslim or acting in the 
name of Islam (Hanes and Machin 2014). Spikes in anti-Muslim hate crimes and 
incidents following ‘trigger’ events are not confided to the physical world; rather, the 
physical world pattern is replicated in the virtual world (Awan 2014). 
Indeed, the Woolwich attack1 was cited by our participants as a terrorist antecedent 
‘trigger’ event, which induced a significant increase in their virtual and physical world 
anti-Muslim hate crime experiences, as the following extracts illustrate:  
I know sisters who have been punched, being shouted at on the street, being pulled and pushed 
around by people, had their houses being burned down. These are the results of trigger events like 
when Lee Rigby was murdered. (Sarah) 
I have figured out over the years that this happens when there is a terrorist attack in the news 
committed by Muslims so Islamophobia happens even more. A clear example is the Lee Rigby 
murder. (Ahmed) 
Littler and Feldman (2015) found that there was a substantial spike in reports of anti-
Muslim hate crime following the Woolwich attack, which ranged from general abuse 
towards ‘visible’ Muslims on the street, to graffiti at mosques, through to firebombs at 
mosques and threats in a cyber context. Britain’s biggest force, the Metropolitan 
police, recorded 500 anti-Muslim hate crimes following the Woolwich attack (The 
Guardian 2013). Furthermore, participants reported that the prevalence of both 
virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate crimes increased following high-profile 
terrorist attacks around the world such as Sydney2, the Charlie Hebdo attack in 
Paris3, and attacks in Copenhagen4 and Tunisia5. Reflecting a spike in both virtual 
and physical world anti-Muslim hate crime, participants stated that: 
I have received Islamophobic abuse in social media and on the street on various occasions. After the 
Sydney incident, I received Islamophobic remarks on four separate occasions in the space of two 
weeks. (Hamza) 
After the Paris attacks, I got a lot of nasty comments especially on social media. (Asma) 
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In addition, it is important to recognise that in a globally connected world, the actions 
by one terrorist group such as ISIS can lead to counter-reactions and impacts on 
Muslims in the UK. Participants pointed out that they were “bombarded with virtual 
and physical world threats” with the prominence of ISIS, especially following the 
release of videos showing beheadings carried out by ISIS or when there was a terror 
threat made against the UK from ISIS members, as the following extracts indicate: 
I keep my Facebook account private but I get a lot of abuse on twitter especially if something has 
happened like when ISIS killed Alan Henning … I recently posted a comment on Channel 4 News 
webpage saying that the ISIS actions are bad and then I got loads and loads of abusive comments 
like “you are part of a terrorist religion”. (Sophie) 
I was on my way to the shops and people shouted at me “why don’t we chop your head off?” In 
another case, people on the street shouted ‘your head will be much better on the floor’. (Sarah) 
Furthermore, national scandals such as the grooming of young girls in Rotherham by 
groups of Pakistani men, twisted by the far-right into a ‘Muslim’ issue or the alleged 
‘Trojan Horse’ scandal in Birmingham framed as a ‘jihadist plot’ to take over schools, 
were also highlighted by our participants as ‘trigger’ events. In the context of the 
Rotherham scandal, ‘Muslim’ was deployed in order to cast all Muslims as 
synonymous with child abusers and indeed participants reported incidents where 
they were called ‘rapists’ and ‘paedos’ – (paedophiles). 
The child sexual abuse scandal in Rotherham and the Trojan Horse investigation at Birmingham 
schools saw an increase in anti-Muslim attacks at record levels. (Hamza) 
I live in Rotherham and the grooming case has portrayed all Pakistani men in Rotherham as 
paedophiles but what about the Jimmy Saville case? Why did they not mention his colour and 
religion? This really frustrates me and makes me angry. (Ibrahim) 
As the following extract demonstrates, a couple of participants pointed out that 
certain Muslim individuals have failed to condemn these ‘trigger’ attacks and 
therefore they were to some extent ‘responsible’ for the rise in anti-Muslim hostility. 
There are Muslims like Anjem Choudary who are proverbial thorns in the side of Islam who refuse to 
condemn the Woolwich attack and the killings committed by ISIS…I am comfortable to speak out 
against the abhorrent actions of ISIS. These people are doing so much damage to the image of Islam 
that not to speak out is a bad thing. (Adam)  
At the same time, some participants highlighted the role of media in reporting of 
these ‘trigger’ events as ‘adding fuel to the fire’. Williams and Burnap (2015) argue 
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that the traditional media play a role in ‘setting the agenda’, ‘transmitting the images’ 
and ‘claims making’ following deviant events of national or international interest. 
According to Hanes and Machin (2014), if attitudes towards Muslims are influenced 
by ‘trigger’ attacks and by media coverage of these attacks, then this finding fits with 
the proposition of ‘attitudinal shocks,’ where a driver of hate crimes is the level of 
hatred or bigotry for a particular group in society, which may be influenced by media 
framing and coverage of attacks. The perceived role of both traditional and social 
media in promoting anti-Muslim sentiments is evident in the following quotes:  
I experience anti-Muslim hostility from people based on what they read on the Daily Mail or what they 
read on Facebook pages by Britain First. (Nabeela) 
My mother is hostile to my hijab. She watches the news and because of the disproportionate 
coverage of Islam and terrorism she thinks that this is what Islam is. (Kelly) 
Relatedly, participants highlighted that people are largely ignorant about the 
teachings of Islam and that the media do not take sufficient action to educate the 
public about what ‘true’ Islam means, as the following extracts illustrate: 
Anti-Muslim hate exists because of ignorance about Muslims that is fuelled by the media. People don't 
understand Muslims because they are not exposed to them. If the only information they get is from 
the media, then they are naturally going to assume that all Muslims are as bad as ISIS. But if you live 
next to Mr and Mrs Khan [common Muslim family name] you will realise that Muslims are just normal 
people. (Sophie) 
In addition to ‘trigger’ events, the visibility of Islam is key to revealing the individual’s 
Muslim identity and thus triggering virtual and physical world anti-Muslim attacks. 
Indeed, it is well established in the literature that there is a significant relationship 
between being visible as a Muslim and experiencing anti-Muslim hate crime (see, for 
example, Allen et al. 2013; Zempi and Chakraborti 2014). In this context, if the 
markers of Islam (for example, a Muslim dress or a Muslim name) are absent, 
‘passing’ as a non-Muslim is possible for those without conspicuous Muslim names 
or dress, and those who do not ‘look like’ a Muslim. Correspondingly, participants 
were convinced that it was their distinctive Muslim appearance that made them a 
target of anti-Muslim hate, as the following extracts illustrate: 
I have a public twitter account to promote my work and I get regular abuse on that. I have my picture 
on my twitter account so they know I am Muslim … I started wearing the hijab two years ago. I was 
not a Muslim before. I did not get any online or offline abuse at all before wearing the hijab. (Sophie) 
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I am identifiable as a Muslim because I have the full beard, I wear a turban and I also wear the Islamic 
clothes. I am a very practising Muslim and I feel that is why I am targeted. (Ibrahim)  
Our study highlights the significance of ‘visible’ Muslim identities in both the virtual 
and physical world. Specifically, young Muslims are particularly vulnerable to abuse 
on social media. According to the Global Digital Data statistics on Internet users, the 
number of people actively using social media networks is 2.078 billion (Kemp 2015). 
In the case of young Muslims we also see a growing population increase and one 
that inevitably have been using social media and the Internet.  In the case of the 
virtual world where Muslims have a visible identity they have been targeted because 
they have been identified by their name, their faith, age, dress, appearance and also 
the views they have expressed online.   
At the same time, Muslim women highlighted feeling vulnerable in a cyber context 
and also in the ‘real’ world because they were visibly identifiable as Muslims. 
Specifically, we found that Muslim women were seen as the personification of the 
‘Islamic problem’ in a cyber context. This was true, when discussing the hijab and 
niqab and the comments used to describe Muslim women on social media sites, 
such as a ‘national security threat’ and comments suggesting that they were forced 
to wear the veil. The hate images and posts in some cases contained a number of 
loaded generalisations with respect to Muslim women as a ‘threat’ because of the 
visible identity. As a result, Muslim women were more likely to receive cyber hate 
messages that stereotyped and demonised them through hostile imagery and 
depicting them in an innately negative manner.  For example, Hira who mainly uses 
Facebook, had to make her Facebook profile private because of the consistent 
online anti-Muslim abuse she has suffered. She noted that: 
I have had to re-adjust all my security settings, so that only friends can contact me or see my profile 
because of the abuse I have suffered. (Hira) 
 
This sense of fear and pervading insecurity in a cyber context is also personified by 
Kelly, who stated that: 
 
These trolls are not the stereotyped EDL, they come from all walks of life and all backgrounds which 
is alarming. They will set up a hoax ID and from there they can abuse anyone with complete 
anonymity and hiding behind a false ID. (Kelly) 
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The relentless abuse Sophie suffered was because of her ‘visible’ presence in the 
virtual world as a White Muslim convert. Halima has also been the victim of the EDL 
cyber mob and had to report the abuse that she had suffered because of the direct 
threats that were made to her life. In Halima’s case, an EDL sympathiser had 
threatened her with physical violence. Below is the conversation that took place in 
the virtual world: 
 
Hahahhahaa I told you my agenda hunny. Don’t worry I will knock you out.' 'Babe let's do a meet and 
greet. We're not far from each other.' 'Save your smart mouth for Saturday. I can't wait. (Sophie) 
 
The virtual world prejudice and discrimination paradigm is used by perpetrators who 
will involve swearing coupled with anti-Muslim, racist language as a means to target 
Muslims. This cyber element is also used by perpetrators where prejudicial 
statements and messages are used to target a particular group or person. Indeed, 
this type of negativity can also lead to an escalation of cyber abuse and the 
normalisation of such behaviour through likes and retweets via social media sites 
such as Twitter and Facebook. However, as we shall see below, both cyber and 
physical world incidents can have a similar pattern and a trend, which is based 
primarily on the perpetrator using abusive and provocative language to pose real 
offline threats against victims, their families and wider Muslim communities. 
 
Similarly to the virtual world, where actual and potential victims are identified through 
the visibility of their Muslim identity, Muslims are equally vulnerable to intimidation, 
violence and abuse on the street, particularly when their Muslim identity is visible 
offline. Evidence suggests that ‘visible’ Muslims – such as Muslim men with a beard 
and Muslim women who wear hijab or niqab – are at heightened risk of anti-Muslim 
hostility in public by virtue of their visible ‘Muslimness’. Specifically, popular 
perceptions that veiled Muslim women are passive, oppressed and powerless 
increase their chance of assault, thereby marking them as an ‘easy’ target to attack. 
We also found that whilst stereotypes were used to depict Muslims in a negative 
manner in the virtual world, such effects were used in the physical world to 
characterise Muslims with strong verbal abuse. For example, Sarah noted that: 
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When I became identifiably Muslim I got nasty looks, threats and abuse, and that’s an everyday 
experience, especially because I am a white British Muslim. (Sarah) 
 
These views were reinforced by comments that were made against Sarah who on a 
daily basis had to hear the following comments ‘Oh you are a Paki lover.’ These 
comments were not isolated to Sarah, but a number of other participants had also 
experienced racist abuse, which they suffered because of their visible identification 
as Muslim. Ahmed stated that: 
 
They call me ‘terrorist’, they call me ‘paki’, I’ve been told ‘fuck off go away’, I get sworn at, and that’s 
mainly because I’m Muslim. The thing is, I am born in this country. I want to live here. (Ahmed) 
 
Mohammad talked about how his children have also been targeted by anti-Muslim 
abuse in schools. He noted that ‘Other pupils call them names like ‘Paki get lost’, 
swearing, ‘go back home’, ‘you don't belong here’, ‘Muslim monkeys’, other pupils 
have pulled their headscarves.’ Sophie stated that: 
 
On my previous school placement, my hijab was sharply pulled by a child, this was witnessed by a 
teacher but was not challenged by them.  (Sophie) 
 
Along similar lines, Hamza stated that ‘I was called a ‘Muslim groomer’ while 
Mohammad also argued that ‘I have been called ‘Muslim terrorist’ and ‘Here come’s 
Osama Bin Laden’. Ultimately, it is important to recognise that the visibility of Islam is 
key to revealing the individual’s Muslim identity and thus triggering cyber attacks 
towards Muslims. For example, in social networking sites individuals might be 
perceived as ‘Muslim’ because of their name, appearance in their profile picture 
(dress for women and beard for men) and comments indicating their affiliation with 
Islam. Visibility is a critical element to prejudice given that “perceptible differences 
are of basic importance in distinguishing between out-group and in-group members” 
(Allport 1979: 132). The power of social perception along with negative attributions 
ascribed to those viewed as visibly different is a key element to understanding hate 
crime in general and anti-Muslim hate crime committed against individuals more 
specifically (Byers and Jones 2008). Without what Allport (1979) refers to as “visible 
differences” in the form of social dress, perceived in-group and out-group 
membership would not be ascribed. He refers to the merging of the “symbol” (e.g., 
 16 
physical and cultural attributes) and what the symbol is perceived to stand for (e.g., 
terrorism, enemy) as “condensation” whereby the visible difference and the ascribed 
meaning given to the symbol come together, thus, creating a key element of the 
necessary perceptual formula for prejudice (Jacobs and Potter 1998: 13). 
In light of the fact that the visibility of their Muslim identity was key to triggering 
attacks, participants took steps to become less ‘visible’ through downplaying or 
concealing their ‘Muslimness’ in order to protect themselves from abuse both in the 
virtual and physical world, as discussed below.  
 
Impacts of virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate crime 
Crime can incur a number of different ‘costs’ following a victimisation experience that 
involve emotional, psychological, physical and financial liabilities. However, evidence 
shows that ‘hate crimes hurt more’. Indeed, empirical studies of targeted 
victimisation emphasise the more severe impact for victims of hate crime when 
compared to non-hate victims (see, for example, Chakraborti et al. 2014; Smith et al. 
2012; Williams and Tregidga 2014). In the context of anti-Muslim hate crime, both 
virtual and physical world attacks upon Muslims ‘hurt’ more than ‘normal’ crimes as 
they are seen as an attack upon the victims’ Muslim identity. From this perspective, 
the impact of anti-Muslim hate crime may exceed that of ‘normal’ crime because of 
victims’ perceived and actual vulnerability due to their affiliation to Islam.  
Our participants reported suffering a range of psychological and emotional 
responses to anti-Muslim hate, from lowered self-confidence and insecurity to 
depression, isolation and anxiety. Given that they were targeted because of the 
‘visibility’ of their Muslim identity – which is easily identifiable because of their Muslim 
name and/or Muslim appearance either in the virtual world or in the physical sphere 
– participants were unable to take comfort in the belief that what happened to them 
was simply random and ‘could have happened to anyone’. Rather, they were forced 
to view this abuse as an attack on their Muslim identity and this had severe 
implications for their levels of confidence and self-esteem as well as for their feelings 
of belonging and safety in the UK.  
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As might be expected, experiences of virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate 
crime increased feelings of vulnerability, fear and insecurity amongst participants. 
Ahmed stated ‘It is scary because we are constantly under attack.’ As mentioned 
previously, the Internet allows people to take on a new and anonymous identity, and 
to bypass traditional editorial controls, to share their views with millions. Cyber anti-
Muslim hate messages can be sent anonymously or by using a false identity, making 
it difficult to identify the offender. As the following quote shows, the anonymity aspect 
in cases of anti-Muslim hate messages in a cyber context is extremely frightening as 
the perpetrator could be anyone and the virtual threats can escalate into the physical 
space.  
I am scared because in face-to-face situations I can see who the perpetrator is but when someone 
does it online I always think who is it? Who is hiding behind the keyboard sending me messages of 
hate? (Aisha) 
Repeat incidents of virtual and physical world anti-Muslim hate increased feelings of 
insecurity, vulnerability and anxiety amongst our participants. Bowling (2009) states 
that repeated or persistent victimisation can undermine the security of actual and 
potential victims, and induce fear and anxiety. The distressing nature of anti-Muslim 
hate crime coupled with the frequency with which these acts were committed, had 
created high levels of fear amongst participants. As a result, they felt extremely 
vulnerable for themselves and they were also concerned about the safely of their 
family. One of our participants, Ibrahim, expressed his fear for the safety of his wife 
who wears the niqab: ‘My wife is very vulnerable when she is on her own. I fear for 
her safety’. A couple of participants warned about the risks of radicalisation, 
especially for young people as a result of suffering virtual and physical world anti-
Muslim hate crime, as the following quote illustrates: 
Anti-Muslim hate crime has affected Muslims. This is why Muslims are going to Syria. This is why they 
support ISIS. When people experience Islamophobic abuse, they will be easily radicalised. They feel 
weak, lonely, isolated, and rejected from British society. (Hamza) 
Affective responses that were common amongst our participants were isolation, 
depression, loneliness, and a sense of rejection from wider society. In this regard, 
experiences of anti-Muslim hate crime have long-lasting effects for victims including 
making them afraid to engage with other communities and feeling like social 
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outcasts. For example, Hafsa, Bilal and Asma reported feelings of social isolation in 
the following quotes:  
I feel very isolated and I have become quite cynical about non-Muslims. (Hafsa) 
Suffering Islamophobia has made me become insular, lack confidence, I feel I am not accepted. 
(Bilal) 
As a result of their recurring experiences of virtual and physical world anti-Muslim 
hate, participants emphasised that they always had to keep their guard up and be 
vigilant. In this regard, they felt anxious and were constantly on the alert. Anxiety 
was usually expressed as excessive fear and worry, which was often coupled with 
feelings of tension, restlessness and vigilance.  
You might find it bizarre but when I walk on the street I am always watching out in case anything 
happens. I am a big guy, six-feet tall, I stand out as a sore thumb. Sometimes people look at me with 
disgust. (Ibrahim)  
It is important to recognise that the continual threat of virtual and physical world 
abuse can be emotionally draining for victims who feel the need to be constantly on 
the alert, even to the extent that they might become paranoid, as the following 
extracts illustrate:  
To be honest, I have slowed down with my openness on twitter because I feel very unsafe, I feel very 
vulnerable. There was a time I felt so vulnerable just being in the UK because of my twitter account. I 
became paranoid, that everybody might be watching me, the government, people, everyone really. 
(Bilal) 
As already indicated, a key finding throughout interviews was that participants were 
multiple and repeat victims of both virtual and physical forms of anti-Muslim hate 
crime. Rarely did participants describe anti-Muslim hate crime as ‘one-off’; rather 
there was always the sense, the fear, the expectation for another attack. From this 
perspective, anti-Muslim hate crime and its attendant forms of virtual and physical 
abuse, intimidation, violence and harassment were seen by the majority of 
participants as ‘normal’ (Awan 2014, Zempi and Chakraborti 2014). The fact that 
anti-Muslim hostility was understood as a normative part of their lived experiences 
also meant that some participants had become ‘used to it’ and therefore ‘immune’ to 
this victimisation, as the following quotes indicate:  
When I suffer abuse in public, people walk off or stare. Anti-Muslim hate is normal. (Sarah) 
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I have been called a “Muslim terrorist” so many times but I have grown a thicker skin as a result. 
(Bilal) 
I am not afraid anymore because I am so used to it. I have to live here so I need to adjust myself to 
the abuse. If I beat the crap out of them I will be in trouble. I take the abuse and keep my head down. 
I just want to carry on with my life. (Muhammad) 
We argue that the victims and perpetrators of anti-Muslim abuse are both located 
and targeted in the cyber and real-world with reference to threats and specific acts of 
violence. We found that for victims and their families, it is often difficult to isolate 
cyber threats from the intimidation, violence and abuse that they suffer in the ‘real’ 
world. Rather, there is a continuity of anti-Muslim hostility in both the virtual and the 
physical world, especially in the globalised world. Specifically, participants 
highlighted the relationship between cyber and physical world anti-Muslim hate 
crime, and described living in fear because of the possibility of threats in a cyber 
context materialising in the physical world, as the following quotes demonstrate: 
I am scared, I fear for my life because at the end of the day they [cyber perpetrators] might come and 
find me because my twitter profile is public. (Aisha) 
I know many Muslims who have been physically attacked and verbally attacked. Personally, I have 
been called “Muslim scum”, “jihadist” and “paedophile”. (Adam) 
In some cases, cyber attacks had effects in the ‘real’ world. For example, in the case 
of Amin, an image was used of him on Twitter with the caption “suspended child 
grooming taxi drivers” despite the post being false and malicious. Amin stated that: 
 
They used a picture of me and said ‘Taxi driver groomer suspended’. The impact has been immense 
because Rotherham is a small town and people get to know things quickly … I can’t even get a job in 
Rotherham now because of this picture. (Amin) 
 
The case of Amin directly shows the link between the virtual and physical world as 
Amin noted how he could not find a job because of the manner in which his picture 
had been used in a cyber context to damage his reputation. He reported feeling 
uncomfortable walking down the streets in Rotherham because people might 
recognise his picture from Twitter, and think that he was one of the perpetrators of 
the grooming scandal. Clearly, cyber hate messages and comments contribute 
towards the stigmatisation and the ‘othering’ of Muslim communities in the ‘real’ 
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world. This shows that in reality, virtual and physical world boundaries may be more 
blurred than the terms imply. 
 
Furthermore, another cost that victims of anti-Muslim hate crime often experience is 
a change in their routines and lifestyles. In this case, the threat of both virtual and 
physical anti-Muslim hate crime is so ‘real’ that it can cause individuals to change the 
way that they live their lives and even take steps to become less ‘visibly’ Muslim. For 
example, some participants who had converted to Islam (such as Sarah, Kelly, 
Sophie and Adam) explained that they kept their English name to avoid suffering 
anti-Muslim hostility whilst other participants who were born into Islam had adopted 
western names in order to hide their Muslim identity, especially in a cyber context. 
Moreover, some participants were reluctant to leave the house, especially on their 
own because of fear of being attacked, as the following quotes indicate: 
We stay in, we don’t go out because we are scared of what will happen. If I leave the house I am 
usually accompanied by my husband or my son. (Nabeela)  
My wife wears the niqab and she had many incidents where people have made nasty remarks, so just 
to avoid conflict we don't go out. (Ibrahim) 
The constant threat of anti-Muslim hate crime had forced participants to adopt a 
siege mentality and keep a low profile in order to reduce the potential for future 
attacks. Zempi and Chakraborti (2014) found that veiled Muslim women often try to 
become less ‘visible’ and as such less vulnerable by taking the veil off. Similarly, our 
participants revealed downplaying their ‘Muslimness’ by taking the Muslim dress off, 
or by dressing in western clothes, as the following extracts illustrate:  
I do not feel safe to wear the hijab up in my hometown because of the dangers there. I take my hijab 
and abaya off when I go to my hometown because of the abuse I will get as a result. (Sarah)  
In this context, participants appear to manage impressions of their Muslim identity in 
the virtual and physical world mainly through concealment with the aim to reduce the 
risk of future abuse. Perry and Alvi (2012) point out that this is not a voluntary 
choice, but the ‘safe’ choice. Whether in cyber or ‘real’ world, anti-Muslim hate crime 
creates ‘invisible’ boundaries, across which members of the Muslim community are 
not ‘welcome’ to step. The enactment of both virtual and physical boundaries 
impacts upon ‘emotional geographies’ in relation to the way in which Muslims 
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perceive the spaces and places around and outside their communities of abode. 
Rather than risk the threat of being attacked, either in a cyber or physical context, 
many actual and potential victims opt to change their lifestyles and retreat to ‘their 
own’ communities.  
Furthermore, several participants felt angry, upset and frustrated because they were 
targeted for being Muslim. Indeed, hate crime studies have established both specific 
and generalised frustration and anger on the part of victims – towards the perpetrator 
and towards a culture of bias and exclusion (Williams and Tregidga 2014).  
I suffer Islamophobia all the time. People have labelled me as a “paki bomber” just by looking at me, 
which makes me very angry. I feel I have to pay for something that it is not even my fault. (Bilal)  
Clearly some participants felt frustrated; however, others felt weak, powerless and 
defenceless on the basis that they were not ‘allowed’ to challenge anti-Muslim hate 
crime, as the following extract indicates: 
When incidents like the Charlie Hebdo happen, I am asked to condemn it and I do condemn it, not 
only as a Muslim but also as a human being, but when attacks against Muslims happen, no one asks 
me to condemn it. That is Islamophobia for me and it is very upsetting…We feel helpless. (Hamza) 
Finally, a couple of participants pointed out that anti-Muslim hate experiences made 
their faith in Islam stronger. In this regard, Islam became a more salient and 
important marker of identity in response to experiences of virtual and physical world 
anti-Muslim hate crime. Such experiences increased in-group solidarity and 
identification with their religious identity. Brown (2001) observes that as Muslim 
identities have been constructed as ‘other’ to western identities, an attempt to distort 
Muslim identities, or to suppress the symbols of these identities, often has the 
opposite effect; it strengthens these identities. As the following quotes show, 
suffering anti-Muslim hate crime made some participants more determined to 
continue to practise Islam.  
Islamophobia has pushed me closer to practising Islam. I am more passionate now about my Muslim 
identity. I feel I don't belong anywhere else. (Bilal) 
I love my hijab more when they attack me for it’ (Asma) 
 
Conclusion 
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The preceding discussion has examined the virtual and physical world, anti-Muslim 
hate crime experiences of Muslim men and women in the UK. Specifically, the aim of 
this article was to examine: (a) the nature and extent of cyber and ‘real’ world anti-
Muslim attacks directed towards Muslims in the UK and (b) the impact of this hostility 
upon victims, their families and wider Muslim communities. The study included 20 in-
depth interviews with Muslims who have been victims of virtual and physical world 
anti-Muslim hate crime, and had reported these experiences to Tell MAMA. Key 
themes that emerged from the research findings included the nature and 
determinants of anti-Muslim hate crime incidence, and the consequences for victims.  
 
Correspondingly, we found that the prevalence and severity of virtual and physical 
world anti-Muslim hate crimes are influenced by ‘trigger’ events of local, national and 
international significance. Terrorist attacks carried out by individuals who identify 
themselves as being Muslim or acting in the name of Islam – such as the Woolwich 
attack, the atrocities committed by ISIS and attacks around the world such as 
Sydney, the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, and attacks in Copenhagen and Tunisia – 
induced a significant increase in participants’ virtual and physical world anti-Muslim 
hate crime experiences. Additionally, national scandals such as the grooming of 
young girls in Rotherham by groups of Pakistani men, and the alleged ‘Trojan Horse’ 
scandal in Birmingham framed as a ‘jihadist plot’ to take over schools, were also 
highlighted by participants as ‘trigger’ events, which increased their vulnerability to 
anti-Muslim hostility. 
 
Participants highlighted that the visibility of their Muslim identity was key to being 
identified as Muslims, and thus triggering virtual and/or physical world anti-Muslim 
attacks. Unarguably, this victimisation increased feelings of vulnerability, fear and 
insecurity amongst participants. They also suffered a range of psychological and 
emotional responses such as low confidence, depression and anxiety. Throughout 
interviews, participants highlighted the relationship between virtual and physical 
world anti-Muslim hate crime, and described living in fear because of the possibility 
of cyber threats materialising in the physical world. The constant threat of anti-
Muslim hate crime had forced participants to adopt a siege mentality and keep a low 
profile in order to reduce the potential for future attacks. Many participants reported 
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taking steps to become less ‘visible’ for example by taking the headscarf off for 
women and shaving their beards for men.  
 
Our research study has found that when it comes to behaviour in the virtual world, 
individuals learn to adapt and behave in certain ways by viewing what other people 
have done. These socially constructed behaviours as purported by Bandura (2004), 
demonstrate how witnessing behaviour in the virtual world can influence perpetrators 
and their decision to target someone. For example, in our study many participants 
spoke about how they have been targeted by a string of cyber comments where 
perpetrators personified similar behaviours and tactics. This means that in many 
cases victims of cyber anti-Muslim hate speech would witness a cyber mob who 
would replicate the same observed behaviours from those who began the thread of 
conversations.  The cyber mobs in this instance are likely to mimic those instructions 
(Bandura 2002). This shows how cyber hate speech becomes a normality and 
adopted by the perpetrators.  
 
Furthermore, these processes have had a huge impact when it comes to how victims 
view the world, their self and others because of the manner in which they perceive 
social identities. In our study, this is relevant to the type of prejudice and 
discrimination they have to encounter, and the social reality that attitudes are shaped 
by the way in which people categorise them as a ‘threat’. The reality is that victims’ 
social reality is placed within a narrative that they are different and therefore they 
have rationalised this fact that they are helpless. Moreover, for victims the 
motivations of being deemed as victims of hate crime becomes normalised to the 
extent that this is their social and human reality. Indeed, Bandura’s model of moral 
disengagement explores how offending behaviour can be justified both in the virtual 
and physical world (Bandura 1990; Bandura et al., 1996).  
 
Ultimately, increased awareness of the nature and impacts of both virtual and 
physical world anti-Muslim hate crime is crucial. Only by raising awareness about 
this problem, and learning about Muslims’ experiences of anti-Muslim hate crime, 
can we begin to address the harmful consequences of this form of hate crime.  
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Notes: 
                                                          
1 Muslim converts Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale murdered Fusilier Lee 
Rigby at the Royal Artillery Barracks in Woolwich, south-east London on 22 May 
2013. 
2 On 15-16 December 2014, Man Haron Monis, an Iranian-born Australian citizen, 
took hostages in a siege at the Lindt Chocolate Café at Martin Place, Sydney. The 
siege resulted in the death of Monis and two hostages. 
3 For three days (from 7 to 9 January 2015), a series of terrorist attacks occurred in 
Paris. On 7 January 2015, brothers Saïd and Chérif Kouachi forced their way into the 
offices of the French satirical weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris and killed 11 
people and injured 11 others in the building. After leaving, they killed a French 
National Police officer outside the building. 
4 On 15 February 2015, a gunman opened fire on a synagogue, hours after one man 
was killed and three police officers wounded during an attack on free speech event 
in city. 
5 On 26 June 2015, a gunman attacked the beach resort of Sousse in Tunisia. ISIS 
claimed responsibility for the attack in which 38 people - plus the gunman - were 
killed. At least 15 of the victims were British. 
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